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Regulatory frameworks are a common tool in governance to incent and coerce 
behaviors supporting national or strategic stability. This includes domestic 
regulations and international agreements. Though regulation is always a 
challenge, the domain of fast evolving threats, like cyber, are proving much more 
difficult to control. Many discussions are underway searching for approaches that 
can provide national security in these domains. We use game theoretic learning 
models to explore the question of strategic stability with respect to the 
democratization of certain technologies (such as cyber). We suggest that such 
many-player games could inherently be chaotic with no corresponding (Nash) 
equilibria. In the absence of such equilibria, traditional approaches, as measures 
to achieve levels of overall security, may not be suitable approaches to support 
strategic stability in these domains. Altogether new paradigms may be needed for 
these issues. At the very least, regulatory regimes that fail to address the basic 
nature of the technology domains should not be pursued as a default solution, 
regardless of success in other domains. In addition, the very chaotic nature of 
these domains may hold the promise of novel approaches to regulation. 
Keywords: democratized technologies; cyber; regulatory regimes; chaos; game 
theory.   
Interesting questions have emerged in recent years asking how to understand 
regulation and strategic stability in domains where we see barriers to deploying novel 
technologies eroding globally (see, e.g., Lehman 2014). The discussion has also been 
framed as deterrence and dissuasion of adversaries using these technologies (Nye 2017). 
This “technology democratization” includes developments in manufacturing, 
computing/cyber/Internet of Things (IoT)/artificial intelligence (AI), chemistry, biology/
gene editing/CRISPR-Cas9 and so forth, but also technologies that arise from the rapid 
convergence across these areas. For example: What do import/export control regulations 
mean in an era of 3D printing? What do international agreements on gene editing mean 
when kits to edit DNA can be ordered on Amazon, eBay, or Alibaba? Many of these 
technologies bring about deep questions on how to impose ethical standards, develop 
overarching regulatory structures, or whether to push for the development of treaties 
and other international agreements.  
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It is appealing to refer to historical approaches that have provided periods of 
strategic stability in other domains. Numerous efforts are underway to do just this. We 
will try to understand whether these experiences and successes are applicable to 
emerging areas driven by these technologies. Among these experiences are treaties tied 
to nuclear testing, such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), those tied to non-
proliferation of weapons, such as the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), or regimes that address the control of materials, tools and approaches 
such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, or the Nuclear Suppliers and Australia Groups. 
There has been the sense that properly phrased treaties or regimes could have similar 
desired effects for regulating these democratized technologies if we know how to better 
structure them. The view has been that these domain are quantitatively different, but not 
qualitatively different. This is the issue we will be exploring. 
In a multilateral world, traditional approaches to strategic stability may not be 
successfully extended to encompass technologies of mass empowerment such as cyber 
or gene editing. For cyber, outside of national efforts, a few multinational approaches 
have been championed, such as the Budapest Convention. At the same time, the pace of 
the technologies, accelerating through the Internet of Things, IoT, and global 
interconnectivity for the case of cyber but analogous for other technologies, is proving 
challenging for such regulatory systems to accommodate. In the case gene editing, little 
beyond imputing ethical norms on practitioners is currently being done (NAS 2017; 
Evitt, Mascharak, and Altman 2015). We would like to understand more fundamentally 
whether the approaching stability using traditional approaches will have any impact on 
areas driven by these heavily democratized technologies. 
To approach this topic, we would like to appeal to an analytic construct that 
allows for a more robust exploration of qualitative differences between traditional 
approaches to stability and the nature of democratized technologies. Game theory 
approaches can serve such a purpose. While having earlier roots, the bipolar dynamics 
of the Cold War helped blossom this field and its application (Poundstone 1992). As a 
tool, it provides a means to understand strategies and options and has found application 
to a broad range of fields (Camerer 2003). Within all these applications, an important 
concept is the Nash equilibrium (Nash 1950). This reflects a stable outcome where 
those involved in the defined game, the players, are aware of  each other’s strategies, 
and recognize that any deviations from where they currently are does not yield any 
benefit to themselves. The Nash equilibria in games are inherent to each specific game, 
and players over time can converge to those states. We could say that our shared 
experience in the negotiation of treaties and regulatory regimes historically could be put 
into the context of the game theoretical approach as follows.  
The purpose of the negotiations can be viewed as the development of a shared 
awareness of the characteristics of the choice-space facing the parties in the negotiation. 
In a successful negotiation, the parties find an agreement that represents the optimal 
trade-off for every party. By definition, these are Nash equilibria. The existence of these 
Nash equilibria is due to the structure and context of the game, not to the negotiations 
themselves. The negotiators deserve credit for the exploration and discovery of the Nash 
equilibria, but they did not create them. Rather the (international) negotiations help to 
non-violently explore the space of available strategies and identify the potential Nash 
equilibria. The outcome of a sustainable agreement - and strategic stability - in this 
sense could be parsed as the mutual discovery of a Nash equilibrium in the game.  
This perspective could also be used to establish if a domain is amenable to a 
negotiated regulatory framework. If an underlying system or game has Nash equilibria, 
then a regulatory regime would be the mechanism to create a shared awareness that 
illuminates the characteristics of the game. There are many places where such regimes 
have yielded long term international stability. In turn, successful regulatory regimes in 
the emerging domains can be seen as contingent on the existence of a Nash equilibrium. 
Then, and only then, can negotiations produce and enduring regulatory framework.  
We will now examine these emerging domains from this perspective by 
reviewing some of the salient features of technologies that are increasingly 
democratized. The traditional role of territorial boundaries as organizing principles for 
governance are giving way to global interconnectedness and a concomitant technology 
empowerment . Tied to this are the evolving and emerging interdependencies of 
technologies as well as short time-scales for evolution compared to that of developing 
regulatory frameworks. The technology empowerment that is characteristic includes the 
increased accessibility and reduced costs. Open platforms enable open innovation and 
enable “fast followers” and co-innovators. Such empowered actors develop in turn other 
surprises, increasing pace and magnitude of potential disruptions. Society (and 
regulators) have difficulty keeping pace with rapid advances defined by rapid learning 
and a large and growing number of participants. 
This type of fluid environment, with growing and evolving power centers, 
increases the complexity of the challenges associated with regulatory regimes and the 
uncertainties in the outcomes. It may not be possible to regulate heavily democratized 
technologies in the traditional sense. Even the international variations in how local or 
regional regulatory regimes are developed may render local standards ineffective, drive 
research to less restrictive countries, and create asymmetries in capabilities. The rapid 
democratization requires new approaches when technological superiority is not viable 
and responses become largely reactive and often too late, especially with the traditional 
R&D cycle.  
In recent years, efforts to include learning and other characteristics into game 
theory have led to more realistic models of human behavior that we could use to capture 
some of the elements described above of those empowered to use democratized 
technologies (players). These include large numbers of players, with many diverse 
motives and strategies and learning that could be paced with technology and with 
correlations among the players. Behavioral models are reasonable approaches since they 
can begin to capture the dynamic learning that evolves with technologies and that player 
strategies can evolve in time based on such experiences and the communications that 
exist between them. Among these approaches, we will focus on the Experience 
Weighted Attraction (EWA) models of Camerer and Ho (Camerer and Ho 1999; 
Camerer 2004). Recent analyses of these models explored and characterized their 
dynamical behaviours (Galla and Farmer 2013; Sanders, Galla, and Farmer 2016), 
allowing the tools and methods from the field of complex physical systems to be 
applied. We will not attempt to reproduce the full details of EWA models since these are 
well described in the literature. Rather we will focus on some of the main features and 
some recent results. For the purpose of the qualitative analysis below, we will focus on 
cyber, where the players are those who can access relevant information technologies, 
who have suites of options on what they may do with these technologies given the 
backdrop of the growing IoT, and where the strategies dynamically evolve apace with 
technology. With the large body of work that exists in cybersecurity, including in both 
regulatory approaches and national and international responses, game theory in many 
forms has been used as a tool to help understand the response of players, however along 
much more traditional lines (Mikolic-Torreira et al. 2016). 
This analysis utilizes the nomenclature developed for describing aspects of game 
theory. The core aspects for any game are: Who are the players? What are the choices 
(strategies) available to each? And, what payoffs (positive or negative) accrue from each 
choice by each player? For a complete description of this field, see Behavioral Game 
Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction by Colin Camerer (Camerer 2003). 
In the EWA models, a number of players p each have strategies they can 
exercise, ! , where !  identifies each player and !  reflects each of 
the N strategies available to each player. Strategies and players should be broadly 
interpreted as any application of technologies at the disposal of individuals, groups, or 
other entities including nation states. The strategies of the players evolve in time 
through learning and communication with other players. In the notation of (Sanders, 
Galla, and Farmer 2016), they are expressed as:  
        (1) 
where β reflects how much current choices are effected by prior successes (Sato and 
Crutchfield 2003) and  !  are dynamic and reflect the 'attractions' to a given player µ 
with strategy i. Numerically, a large value for β represents players that are driven by 
choosing the most rewarding strategy and simply repeat it over and over, while small β 
reflects players who tend to choose strategies randomly in time. The exponential form 
has been empirically justified (Camerer and Ho 1999), and also allows for invariance 
with respect to a constant shift in ! and for positive and negative attractions.  
The attractions are updated in time according to (Sanders, Galla, and Farmer 
2016): 
        (2) 
In this form there are two competing terms: a “memory loss rate” α and the correlation 
or "payoff" matrix ! . The memory loss rate α, which ranges from 0 to 1, captures 
how much of prior experience and success in applying the technologies continues to 
impact decisions at later times. For smaller α, there is a stronger memory of prior 
history of successful uses of the technologies. For α closer to 1, there is smaller impact 
on prior applications of the technologies on what a given player will do next. The risks 
and rewards for a player’s actions through the choice of their strategy is captured in 
payoff matrix ! , which denotes the payoff to player µ if they play strategy i and the 
other players play all their respective strategies, denoted simply as ! .  The symbol 
!  is intended to be short-hand to represent the strategies of all other !  
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players other than player i, and their corresponding strategies. We do not attempt to 
recreate the full details of these models found in (Camerer 2004; Sanders, Galla, and 
Farmer 2016) and only wish to highlight the structures, their relationship to 
democratized technologies and potential dynamical ranges for the behaviors. Equation 
(2) balances how much a strategy is impacted from learning versus interactions and 
correlations with the other players who have their own strategies. 
For a heavily democratized technology, an abundance of players with many 
strategies available to them, and in the absence of more specific information on the 
players, it is reasonable to apply a maximum entropy principle to the structure of the 
payoff matrix, as in (Berg and Weigt 1999; Sanders, Galla, and Farmer 2016). The 
overall statistical strength of interactions between players then has the following gross 
structure: 
     (3) 
The correlation between different players  !  is characterized by a strength Γ, 
which can range from -1 to the number of strategies p-1. In this notation, the impacts on 
the payoffs range from fully correlated players in a zero-sum game !  to the 
opposite limit in which players are fully uncorrelated with each other ! , or to the 
situation where all payoffs are all identical regardless of what the players do 
! . 
What is important here is the sign of the correlation function, Γ, and how players 
cooperate. In this elementary instantiation of an EWA model, we have five relevant 
parameters: ! , the number of players p and the 
number of strategies N per player.   
There are many ways to think of the correlation function for the payoffs. With 
democratized technologies, by definition, there are many players and the empowerment 
is possible because of the correlations between players through awareness of 
technological opportunities and surprises. One could view the vitality of the Dark Web 
as an illustration of how players might wish to retain correlations among themselves but 
not necessarily cooperate in a specific shared goal. There are exceptions of course. In 
the case of the members of the group calling itself Anonymous, there was an appeal to 
define a shared outcome and payoff, but largely these are exceptions (Firer-Blaess 
2016). So we might expect that !  would be a good characterization for the 
cyber domain: correlated, competitive, not fully cooperative and not zero-sum. For 
learning, we would expect that players learn from prior attempts to apply strategies, so 
that α would be closer to 0 than 1. Similarly, if we expect players to use strategies that 
are not fully random but rather built on prior successes, then we expect β to be a large 
positive quantity. Hence it is likely that for cyber as well as democratized technologies, 
! , and both N and p are large positive integers. 
In the study of complex physical systems, stability analysis helps characterize 
the expected nature of the system evolution over time. Stability analysis of particular 
limits of EWA models have recently found that there can be regions without Nash 
equilibria and that these are characterized by chaotic responses by the players. That is to 
say, players respond to the structure of the payoff (risk/reward) structure in 
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unpredictable ways. Our experience in the study of complex systems, both at the 
classical and quantum mechanical level, is that the presence of chaos is commonplace, 
and its presence allows for extraction of generic features of theories and of nature 
(Reichl 2004). We would expect that generic features of chaotic many-person game 
theory models likely exist and could develop in time. In few-body physical systems, as 
in few-player games (i.e. the Cold War), the absence of chaos is typical. However, it 
does not take too many additional degrees of freedom before physical systems get 
chaotic, often due to non-linearities and/or feedback, and as a matter of course, chaotic 
behavior is more the norm than the exception (Skyrms 1992). In chaotic games, player 
responses become dynamically unstable and unpredictable, and as a consequence the 
game itself may not have any (Nash) equilibria. We would like to use the structure of 
these many-player games to better define differences between historic regulatory 
regimes and the challenges we face today with the democratization of certain 
technologies. This would help guide work hoping to produce stability in these important 
domains. 
Within the analysis of EWA models, and in the limit of a large number of players 
each with many strategies, the boundary between stable (non-chaotic) and unstable 
(chaotic) regimes of player responses can be extracted from (Sanders, Galla, and Farmer 
2016) to be approximately given by: 
    .        (4) 
So for  !  the behaviour is not chaotic and player strategies converge to stable 
equilibria – that is, the systems evolves into a controlled outcome for behaviors. But for 
smaller values and !  the behaviour of the system is chaotic and the response of 
players is unstable and they will evolve in time effectively randomly despite the 
controls on their behaviour. As we have argued for cyber, ! , so that !
is quite reasonable so that behaviour of the system is well within the chaotic domain and 
is without any equilibria. Consequently, if one wanted to devise a regulatory regime that 
would drive to stable outcomes in the more traditional sense, one would need to satisfy: 
             (5) 
Keeping in mind that α∈[0,1], and the number of players is large by definition, one 
would need regulatory frameworks to drive players to β→0, or compelling players to 
weigh all of their available strategies with equal probability of use. One can view this as 
heavy coercion that makes any play equally risky or poor, regardless of their experience 
and prior successes, or it could be viewed as appealing to their good sides and 
adherence to ethical standards by a preponderance of players.  
 In the absence of such sweeping mechanisms to modify behaviors, the outcome 
will be the absence of Nash equilibria, and ongoing chaotic behaviors. But again, 
regardless of the overarching regulatory construct, there are no points of stability. This 
latter case could be viewed as the implementation of dissuasion through norms, as 
proposed by (Nye 2017). 
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The utility of Cold War Era game theory was facilitated by the very limited 
number of players (nuclear capable nations). With the extraordinarily high entry cost to 
become a nuclear power, the conditions for using game theory were tractable and that 
approach has proved useful. These conditions are not present when looking at such 
highly democratized technologies as cyber and gene editing. The more recent 
development of many-player learning models in game theory can provide a means to 
capture some of these salient features of the complex global ecosystem of players that 
have growing access to increasingly democratized technologies.  
What does chaos mean? It is the time evolution of player strategies that are 
found to evolve chaotically in time or alternatively, player responses are unpredictable 
and there is no equilibrium to be had. In the study of physical systems, the identification 
of chaotic behavior has allowed use of techniques from dynamical systems theory or 
random matrix theory to compute quantities that could then be related to experimental 
observations. As a general rule, many physical models with realistic features are 
analytically intractable, so that chaotic or ergodic limits of their behavior can be used as 
a means to identify behaviors that are robust and independent of model specifics. It also 
allows the computation of certain types of physical observables that behave generically 
or universally. The identification of regimes where physical systems are chaotic has 
allowed the prediction and understanding of many experimental observations. 
Game theory based models remain as abstractions of human behaviors, but with 
increasing refinements and validation over time they can be useful tools to help frame 
thinking and actions. Looking at this class of problems today in a more rigorous 
analytic approach may not shed further light. But it does lead to classes of questions we 
should be asking as we approach ubiquitous technologies that have dual use 
characteristics. While we focused on cybersecurity in this analysis, democratized 
technologies such as gene editing (CRISPR-Cas9 and its follow-ons) share the same 
characteristics. These are technologies where the technical barriers for entry and the 
associated costs and infrastructure continue to see dramatic reductions so that traditional 
international variations in approaches to such rapidly changing fields can render local 
standards ineffective and drive activities to less restrictive places. Within the fields 
themselves there can be growing recognition that action is needed. In the regulatory 
construct recently proposed for gene editing technologies (Evitt, Mascharak, and 
Altman 2015), we would argue that this approach provides ethical people a means to be 
ethical and demonstrate that they are. Approaches like this can bias good people to be 
good (e.g. through laws, penalties, etc) but they don’t change the underlying state of the 
system. The recent study by the National Academies have also weighed in on ensuring 
adherence to ethical standards (NAS 2017). The question for any of the democratized 
technologies is how does one drive this to β→0 in order to satisfy Eq. (5)? 
This analysis indicates that it is possible that chaotic games will lead to classes 
of model-independent predictions that help understand the features of the complex 
human behaviors that the games are meant to explain (Chakraborti et al. 2015). This 
understanding could, in turn, guide policy and regulatory negotiations in the most 
fruitful directions. It is possible that salient features are expressible through such models 
and, as a consequence, help in guiding new approaches to dealing with heavily 
democratized technologies could emerge. This is true even though we cannot expect 
game theory to be detailed predictors of human behavior. Rather it may be a first step to 
recognize that something different may be needed. Finally, it is worth noting that in 
chaos theory, the field of controlling chaos emerged as a means to provide (small and 
well placed) feedback into a chaotic system to limit instabilities in the behavior of a 
system (Ott, Grebogi, and Yorke 1990). If regulatory regimes for democratized 
technologies fall into the category of chaotic games, as we argue, it might be that there 
are analogous types of feedback that could be developed to mitigate the resulting 
unpredictability of behavior. Suitable feedback in broader definitions of regulatory 
regimes or even preparedness against threats coevolving with technology could be a 
parallel to bringing some form of strategic stability. Whether or not we choose EWA 
models as a starting point, the democratization of technologies by definition is 
underpinned by a breadth of players, many targets and strategies, and a complex risk/
reward structure. If learning is part of the player experience, and players communicate 
through the open literature or through more clandestine means, the essence of non-linear 
dynamics remains and it is very likely that chaotic behavior is the expected outcome. 
Then the question becomes how should we approach the regulation of inherently 
complex environments? 
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